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THE 1992 EUROPEAN UNIFICATION: EFFECTS IN
THE AIR TRANSPORT INDUSTRY
MONICA L. LUEBKER
I. INTRODUCTION
We must build a kind of United States of Europe.
Winston Churchill, 1945
B Y DECEMBER 31, 1992, the Member States of the Eu-
ropean Economic Community (EC) will create a uni-
fied internal market composed of 323 million people, the
largest commercial market in the industrial world.' All ar-
tificial barriers are to be eliminated in order to allow
goods to circulate freely among the Member States.2 The
economic community concept was established in 1957 be-
tween six European countries under the Treaty Establish-
ing the European Economic Community (Treaty).3 After
thirty years of negotiation and compromise, the concept
will soon become a reality.
Market unification encompasses all areas of commerce
affecting the twelve Member States. Some of the activities
used by the EC to promote harmonious economic devel-
I M. EMERSON, M. AJUJEAN, M. CATINAT, P. GOYBET & A. JACQUEMIN, THE Eco-
NOMICS OF 1992, at 11 (1988) [hereinafter M. EMERSON].
2 Thieffry, Van Doorn & Lowe, The Single European Market: A Practitioner's Guide
to 1992, 12 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 357 (1989).
- Treaty Establishing the European Economic Comnlunity, Mar. 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 14 (entered into forceJan. 1, 1958) [hereinafter Treaty]. Member States
include Belgium (1958), France (1958), Luxembourg (1958), Germany (1958),
The Netherlands (1958), Italy (1958), Denmark (1973), Ireland (1973), The
United Kingdom (1973), Greece (1981), Spain (1986), and Portugal (1986). D.
LEONARD, POCKET GUIDE TO THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY xii (1988); see also Europe
1992: A Basic Guide, BARRISTER, Fall 1989, at 41 [hereinafter Europe 1992].
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opment include: (1) the elimination of customs duties; (2)
the creation of a common policy toward third countries;
(3) the removal of obstacles to allow the free movement of
persons, services and capital; (4) the creation of a com-
mon fund to promote social welfare throughout the EC;
(5) the prohibition of anticompetitive conduct in the busi-
ness sector; and (6) the creation of a common policy to
facilitate transportation by road, rail and air.
Air transport, a rapidly growing industry in Europe, is
particularly dependent on mutual international coopera-
tion. The effect of the internal market on transportation
is important both for the consumer and for businesses op-
erating within the Member States.5 In the past, air trans-
portation has been a luxury in Europe as a result of
exorbitant ticket prices. Yet, there is renewed hope that
this mode of travel will become available to a larger
number of individuals with the advent of airline liberaliza-
tion and the recent trend toward privatization of govern-
ment owned carriers.
This comment will address the effect of the common
market scheme on the air transport sector in both Mem-
ber and non-member states. First, it will explain the gen-
eral concepts behind 1992 European unification.6
Second, it will show how airlines fit within the purview of
the Treaty's transportation policy 7 and outline resistance
to a common policy exhibited by some Member States.8
Third, it will illustrate arguments both for and against a
deregulated airline system in Europe.9 Finally, it will ana-
lyze concerns about deregulation held by the United
EEC Competition Rules-Guides for Small and Medium Sized Enterprises, EuR. Doc.
SERIES 11 (1983) [hereinafter EEC Competition Rules].
. See M. EMERSON, supra note 1, at 115. "The economic interests of the geo-
graphically peripheral regions of the Community are particularly concerned, since
uncompetitive air transport aggravates their locational disadvantages, and compe-
tition from other modes of transport is less intense." Id.
(I See infra notes 11-67 and accompanying text.
7 See infra notes 68-151 and accompanying text.
8 See infra notes 152-175 and accompanying text.
i, See infra notes 176-251 and accompanying text.
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States airline industry.' 0
II. DEVELOPING THE INTERNAL MARKET CONCEPT
A. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community
Before going into a detailed inspection of the EC's air
transport policies, it is important to understand the back-
ground of the concepts involved, beginning with the EC's
establishment. In 1957, many different economic and
physical barriers existed between the Member States.
These barriers included customs duties, import and ex-
port quotas, as well as controls on the movement of citi-
zens and capital." The recognition of the need for an
economically and politically sound Europe arose from
widespread devastation existing in the aftermath of World
War 11.12
The signing of the European Coal and Steel Treaty of
1951 marked the first step toward economic integration.' 3
The success of this pilot project in the coal and steel in-
dustry encouraged the formation of the Treaty Establish-
ing the European Economic Community, signed on
March 25, 1957.' 4 The Treaty's function was the progres-
See infra notes 252-267 and accompanying text.
CLIFFORD CHANCE, 1992 AN INTRODUCTORY GUIDE, Nov. 1988, at 1 (publica-
tion of the merged firm of Coward Chance and Clifford-Turner to provide a sum-
mary of the European Community).
12 The Effects of Greater Economic Integration Within the European Commu-
nity on the United States, USITC Pub. 2204, Inv. No. 332-267 (July 1989) (Report
to the Committee on Ways and Means of the U.S. House of Representatives and
the Committee on Finance of the U.S. Senate) [hereinafter Report]. The "con-
cerns over preserving and strengthening peace, combined with the devastation
from World War II, motivated many Europeans to seek a united Europe, in the
military and political sphere as well as for economic reasons." Id. at 1-5.
11 The European Community at a Glance, Delegation of the Comm'n of Eur. Com-
munities Pub. 4 (1982) (economic unification began by pooling the Member
State's coal and steel resources).
14 Treaty, supra note 3. On this same date the European Atomic Energy Com-
munity (EURATOM) was created to coordinate the EC in developing a powerful
nuclear industry. Report, supra note 12, at 1-5. In addition, Member States be-
long to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD),
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GAT'T), and the Council of Europe,
and also maintain close relationships with international bodies such as the United
Nations. The European Community at a Glance, supra note 13, at 12.
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sive eradication of internal barriers over a twelve year pe-
riod in order to further peace, unity, equality, freedom,
solidarity, and economic and social security.' 5
The common market achieved rapid progress in the
early years. The abolition of industrial tariffs and the es-
tablishment of a common external tariff between the then
six Member States was accomplished eighteen months
earlier than planned. 16 Unfortunately, the recession of
the 1970s as well as inaction caused by budget quarrels
among the Member States resulted in the advent of pro-
tectionist measures and a general decline in EC coopera-
tion. 1 7 Member States introduced nontariff barriers and
requested public aid to protect and maintain uncompeti-
tive businesses.' 8 By the early 1980s, most Europeans
had lost all confidence in the EC and the term "Euroscler-
osis" was coined to explain the indifferent performance of
the common economy.' 9
B. Statement of Goals and Setting a Date for Progress
By 1985, the EC recognized the increasing need to op-
erate as a large scale unified market in order to effectively
face its economic competitors-most significantly the
United States and Japan. 20 A producer within a unified
market can maximize profits to a much greater degree
than a producer operating in one of twelve individual
markets each having distinctive rules and characteristics. 2 '
Recognizing the value of the unified market, the EC Com-
1- The ABC's of Community Law, EUR. Doc. SERIES 10 (1984).
10 Report, supra note 12, at 1-5. The abolition of industrial tariffs was com-
pleted on July 1, 1968. Id.
17 Id. at 1-6.
is Id.
19 Id.
2o Thieffry, Van Doom & Lowe, supra note 2, at 357-58. The EC maintains a
higher unemployment rate and lower per capita Gross Domestic Product than the
U.S. and Japan. "Between 1979 and 1985, the share of EC exports of industrial
goods ... declined by 1.4 percent, compared with an increase of 0.7 percent for
the United States and 5.4 percent forJapan." Report, supra note 12, at 1-6.
21 Thieffry, Van Doom & Lowe, supra note 2, at 358 n.5. "The single market
implies scale economies, more competition and mutual stimulation within the
Community, and increased cooperation between European companies." Id.
[56
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mission set out a comprehensive program for the comple-
tion of the internal market in the "White Paper" of June
1985.2 In this paper, the Commission outlined 300
measures defining the goals that must be satisfied in order
to complete the internal market." Furthermore, it set a
specific completion date, December 31, 1992 .24 The
three goals outlined in the White Paper concern: (1) the
removal of physical barriers through elimination of bor-
der controls; (2) the removal of technical barriers through
the free movement of labor and capital; and (3) the re-
moval of fiscal barriers through such measures as harmo-
nization of social security and value-added taxes.25 The
objectives of the White Paper were then formally adopted
by the Single European Act (SEA) as an amendment to
the original Treaty.26
The measures adopted under the White Paper are
merely directives. The directives must be incorporated
into the laws of each Member State before they become
binding.27 Difficulties have been encountered in some
states, such as Germany and Ireland, where constitutional
22 Report, supra note 12, at 1-5. The White Paper is officially entitled "Com-
pleting the Internal Market." Id.
2. Id. at 1-6.
24 Id. The selection of this date was intended to coincide with the end of the
next EC Commission's term. Id. For a discussion of the institutions governing
the EC see infra notes 31-46 and accompanying text.
2.1 M. EMERSON, supra note 1, at 21. The projected macroeconomic effect of
removing these economic barriers is as follows:
Gross domestic product'- Increase ranging from 4.5% to 7%
Consumer prices - Reduction ranging from 6% to 4.5%
Employment - Increase ranging from 1.75 to 5 million employed
Public sector balance - Improvement ranging from 2.25% to
0.5% as a percentage of GDP
External trade balance - Ranges from an improvement of 1% of
GDP to a deterioration of .25%.
CLIFFORD CHANCE, supra note 11, at 13.
26 The Single Act: A New Frontier for Europe, BULL. EUR. COMMUNITIES (Supp. Jan.
1987). The orientation of the 1957 Treaty has been changed significantly. Origi-
nally, the focus was one of "harmonization of laws" which now only remains effec-
tive as far as taxation and customs procedures are concerned. The focus after the
SEA is on deregulation and mutual recognition which would liberalize the free
movement of products, people and financial services. Europe 1992, supra note 3, at
43.
27 CLIFFORD CHANCE, supra note 11, at 16.
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problems must be resolved before a ratification of the
SEA can be perfected. 8 Other Member States have ex-
perienced similar difficulties in implementation because
of internal political barriers. 9 If a Member State does not
adopt implementing legislation in furtherance of the di-
rectives, the EC doctrine of "mutual recognition" subjects
that Member State to the possibility of forced recognition
of the directives as adopted by others.30
C. The Four Governing Institutions of the EC
The bureaucratic system implementing and interpret-
ing EC law is made up of four principal institutions: the
EC Commission, the Council of Ministers, the European
Parliament, and the European Court ofJustice. The inter-
twining of the administrative bodies of the EC makes
adoption of new policies affecting any sector, including
transport, difficult.
The EC Commission, a seventeen member body chosen
by agreement of the EC governments, is responsible for
Treaty implementation and also for initiating EC policy,
proposals and directives.3 ' The Commission, as the en-
2" Report, supra note 12, at 1-18, 19.
29 Id. at 1-19 n.154. Italy and Greece maintain the poorest record for imple-
mentation of directives:
Directives Directives












Europe 1992, supra note 3, at 43.
Report, supra note 12, at 1-11 to 1-12; see also The ABC's of Community Law,
supra note 15, at 16-20. Of the 17 commissioners, two are sent from the five
larger states (Germany, U.K., Italy, France, Spain) and one from each of the other




forcement body of the EC, pursues violations of the
Treaty by issuing reasoned opinions against the viola-
tors32 or by instituting proceedings in the European Court
of Justice.33
The second governing institution is the Council of Min-
isters, the EC's principal decision making body. 4 The
Council, being the legislative and executive body com-
bined, coordinates the economic aspects of the Commu-
nity through its administrative and financial decisions.
The position of president in the Council rotates among
the Member States' delegates on a six month basis. 5
The judicial branch of the EC, the European Court of
Justice (ECJ), was established to ensure that the interpre-
tation and application of Treaty law is observed. 36  The
thirteen judges of the ECJ sit for six year terms and are
eligible for reappointment. 7 The ECJ looks to several
" Treaty, supra note 3, art. 169; see also 3 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 4402.04
(1978).
31 Treaty, supra note 3, arts. 169, 173, 175. For other methods of enforcement
in particular circumstances see id., arts. 93, 255.
34 The SEA changed the voting procedure from requiring unanimous decisions
to one of qualified majority. Member States' votes are weighed as follows:













Treaty, supra note 3, art. 148(2); see also Report, supra note 12, at 1-13 n.87.
' The rotation cycle for Member States is as follows:
(1) for a first cycle of 6 years, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece,
Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal,
U.K.; (2) for a second cycle of 6 years, Denmark, Belgium, Greece,
Germany, France, Spain, Italy, Ireland, Netherlands, Luxembourg,
U.K., Portugal.
Report, supra note 12, at 1-12 n.73.
-, Treaty, supra note 3, art. 164.
17 Treaty, supra note 3, art. 167.
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sources when defining the "law" of the EC, including
treaties of the Member States, amendments to those trea-
ties, common law, and general principles of international
and national law.38 Community law, as recognized by the
ECJ, enjoys primacy over each Member States' national
law.39 This premise can create certain "jurisprudential
obstacles, ' 40 however, a willingness to cooperate rather
than to thwart the progress of the EC has been the trend
within the Community.
The ECJ has been assuming a more prominent role in
Europe as 1992 looms ever closer. The Commission has
begun to institute numerous cases in the ECJ against
Member States under Article 169 of the Treaty for failure
to implement EC directives. 4' To alleviate a portion of
this overcrowded docket the EC has created a "Court of
First Instance."' 42 Yet, in the near future both courts may
be unable to deal with the ever increasing demands, espe-
cially if other European countries are allowed to join the
EC.
The fourth institution, the European Parliament, serves
as a political check on the other three EC institutions.
The Parliament consists of 518 members elected directly
by the citizens of the EC for five year terms.43 Through
formal questions the Parliament oversees the institutions'
activities, forces them to delineate their positions, encour-
." See, e.g., Alvis v. Commission, 2 COMMON MKT. L.R. 396 (1963) (applying ad-
ministrative law of the Member States); Commission v. Italian Republic, Common
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8802 (1962) (applying principles of international law); Stauder
v. City Ulm, Common Mkt Rep. (CCH) 8077 (1970) (stating that general princi-
ples of law include rights derived from the Member States' constitutions); see also
Report, supra note 12, at 1-2.
39' Thieffry, Van Doorn & Lowe, supra note 2, at 359. Yet Member States are
reluctant to cede too much sovereignty to the Community. Report, supra note 12,
at 1-8.
-0 Specifically, obstacles such as the possibility of community law conflicting
with national law may be created. See Thieffry, Van Doorn & Lowe, supra note 2, at
359.
41 E.C. News, EUROPE, Aug. 1990, at 52.
42 Id.
4- 3 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 4306 (1987). The representatives are to act
for the benefit of the entire Community and not solely for the Member State they
represent. Demystifying the Working of the E.G., supra note 31, at 38. This is evi-
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ages new policy initiatives, and gathers information for fu-
ture policy developments.44 In addition, Parliament may
bring suit against the Commission for the failure to act in
enforcing the Treaty.45 Finally, the Parliament has the ul-
timate power of the purse by holding a legislative veto
over the Community budget.4 6
D. The Future of the EC
The 1992 target date places none of the Member States
under a formal time constraint. 47 It is just that-a target
date. The market unification concept is not a rigid struc-
ture but a concerted effort of cooperation. 48 EC leaders
are doubtful that the common market will be completed
by the 1992 unification date, due to many sensitive issues
yet unresolved. 49 This date, however, creates a united
denced by the fact that members sit by party affiliation and not by nationality.
Report, supra note 12, at 1-14.
Even though nationality is not a problem, there has been some dispute over the
designated meeting place of Parliament. A recent compromise allows the sessions
to be held in both Strasbourg and Brussels. See Parliament Compromise, EUROPE,
May 1990, at 47.
44 Report, supra note 12, at 1-14. Parliament issued an average of 600 questions
per year in the early 1970s, which increased to approximately 500 oral questions
and 2000 written questions in the 1980s. Id. at n.109.
4. Id.
4o Id. at 1-14.
47 Id. at 1-8 n.27.
4. Id. (stating that failure to meet the 1992 deadline will not result in any legal
repercussions).
41, Monetary union and tax harmonization are two of the most hotly contested
issues. Id. at 1-8, 1-9. "In a speech presented in Bruges, Belgium . . . British
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher confirmed her opposition to European political
and monetary union and her concern over ceding national sovereignty to Brus-
sels." Id. at 1-8.
The ECU, worth a little more than one dollar, was created in 1979 as a unit of
account for measuring the budget of the EC. Recently it has become increasingly
popular in international transactions. The ECU, however, does not exist in the
form of coins or paper and is therefore difficult to use in daily transactions.
Claveloux, Use the ECU, EUROPE, Nov. 1989, at 11. The ECU is an amalgamation
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front for European countries and shows a willingness to
cooperate to achieve specified goals of economic
harmony.
Non-member states have also gradually accepted the
concept. The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
(COMECON), which rejected the EC's legitimacy for
over thirty years, signed an agreement in June of 1988 es-
tablishing official ties. 50 Also in 1988, the Soviet Union,
along with five other Eastern European countries, re-
quested formal diplomatic relations with the EC.5' Other
non-member states such as Norway, Austria, Malta and
Turkey have expressed "official" interest in EC member-
ship.52 Some analysts predict that the EC membership
could increase to as many as twenty-seven states at some
point in the future.53 The Commission has expressed
concern, however, that future additions to the community









New ECU Fixed, EUROPE, Nov. 1989, at 45.
.1" Report, supra note 12, at 1-10. Also, in 1963 at Yaounde, Cameroon, the first
Association Convention was signed between the EC and 18 African states. These
types of agreements have been renewed and expanded continually to include up
to 60 African, Caribbean and Pacific countries. The European Community at a Glance,
supra note 13, at 11.
- Id.
-2 Report, supra note 12, at 1-10. Norway and Austria are a part of the Euro-
pean Free Trade Association (EFTA) which was established for many of the same
reasons as the EC. The member states of EFTA, however, favor a looser intergov-
ernmental cooperation for economic unity which does not infringe upon national
sovereignty. Other members of EFTA include Sweden, Finland, Iceland, and
Switzerland. By agreement EFTA members are allowed duty free trade with the
EC. See also Dale, The Changing Map of Europe, EUROPE, Aug. 1990, at 9. In addi-
tion to the four countries discussed above, Cyprus is also expected to officially
apply for.membership soon. Id. at 9.
.5' Dale, supra note 52, at 9. In order to arrive at this number analysts include, in
addition to those countries discussed above, Finland, Iceland, Bulgaria, Romania,
Albania and the Soviet Union. Id.
-54 Report, supra note 12 at 1-10. Further, it is unlikely that Turkey will be wel-
One answer to this potential stumbling block would be
to admit all states wishing to become members through
"associate status," increasing to full membership after the
1992 changes have been implemented.5 5 As currently or-
ganized, however, the community and its institutions
could not withstand this type of growth. An EC with
twenty official languages and numerous social back-
grounds could not be as easily integrated as the present
Member States-all of which, except Ireland, are mem-
bers of NATO and possess close Western ties.56
Yet as recent developments have shown, East-West phi-
losophies are no longer polarized. With the fall of com-
munism and the Warsaw Pact, Member and non-member
states have more in common than ever before.-" With this
obstacle removed, some sort of integration between
Member and non-member states seems inevitable,
whether it be through associate status, full membership or
otherwise.
The reunification of West and East Germany will also
have a profound effect on the current structure of the EC.
With the demolition of the Berlin Wall and the sound of
"Wir Sind das Volk"-"We are the people" - in the air,
reunification is a popular concept.58 In fact, even the
Member States of the EC welcome German reunification
and are of the view that its effects will be favorable.59
At first, commentators expressed fear that Germany's
preoccupation with internal battles would halt the EC's
corned with open arms into the EC due to political tensions existing between the
Turks and the Germans.
" Dale, supra note 52, at 9.
, Neutral Status No Obstacle, EUROPE, Mar. 1990, at 46.
.17 Dale, Europe's New Architecture, EUROPE, Aug. 1990, at 7.
- Edgar, Germany After the Wall, 7 THE WORLD POL'YJ. 190 (1990). Edgar states
that the reunification was triggered by the popular frustration of the East German
people, the realization that the Soviet Union had no intention of saving Erich
Honecker's regime and the opening of Hungary's borders. Id. at 189.
.5' Dale, supra note 52, at 8; Roth & Mosspberg, Berlin Shake Up: Purge of Hard
Liners in East Germany Stirs Unification Hope, Wall St.J., Nov. 9, 1989, at A12, col. b.
(stating that the EC had great concern over a New Germany with one foot in the
door of NATO and the other foot firmly entrenched in the Warsaw Pact).
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progress.6 0 German officials have repeatedly expressed
their desire, though, to accelerate the EC's integration
and to remain firmly entrenched in the Western Alli-
ance. 6 1 Many EC members are not as concerned with
German allegiance to Western ideals as with preventing a
powerful Germany from dominating Central and Eastern
Europe. 62 EC officials point out that one of the key rea-
sons for forming the European Community was to rebuild
a desecrated Europe after Word War II and to place a
check on further exploitation.6 3 In response to these fears
Chancellor Helmut Kohl has advocated the granting of in-
creased authority to the European Parliament, in order to
legitimize its existence.' He further emphasized that
before any of the Member States agree to hand over sov-
ereign rights, a proper system of checks and balances
must be instituted and properly controlled by the Euro-
pean Parliament. 65 It would appear from these actions
that Germany intends to put checks upon its own power
through the EC.66
It is difficult to predict Europe's future political struc-
ture due to the rapid changes constantly taking place; but
one thing is known: a united Germany will play a key role
in this scheme due to the country's expansive labor force,
monetary stability and political power. The German
question and other potential internal conflicts 67 within the
EC will play an important part in whether or not the 1992
internal market integration actually is successful.
Kaps, A United Germany in the New Europe, EUROPE, Aug. 1990, at 20.
Id. On April 28, 1990, at the European Council in Dublin, German Chancel-
lor Helmut Kohl presented, in conjunction with French President Mitterrand, a
proposal to commit to political union by 1993. Id.
' Dale, supra note 52, at 8.
(' Roth & Mosspberg, supra note 59.
64 Kaps, supra note 60, at 20-21.
65 Id. at 21.
C-. Most Germans actually welcome the fact that the EC is being redesigned to
'contain" Germany. Dale, supra note 52, at 10.
67 See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
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III. THE TRANSPORTATION POLICY WITHIN THE
INTERNAL MARKET
Assuming a smooth transition into 1992, transportation
services will play a fundamental role in the EC's develop-
ment.68 The free movement of goods and passengers is
necessary to establish an economy of scale. Physical and
technical barriers may be eliminated, yet a market cannot
be considered fully integrated if transportation costs re-
main so high that businesses cannot afford to ship com-
modities across Member States' borders. Unless
transportation costs decrease, deregulation of the trans-
port industry will remain a mere theoretical prospect.
In the past, transportation has been highly regulated.
Surface and air transport in Europe are considered public
services and are controlled for the most part by either the
local or the central government. 69 Control is exercised
through dependence on government subsidies due to the
fact that fares account for only 50% of the revenues re-
quired to cover transport service costs. 7 0 This type of reg-
ulation fosters a fragmented economy since exportation
and importation of goods depend upon efficient methods
of transportation. Estimates indicate that this type of eco-
nomic fragmentation increases the cost of consumer
goods by 10% and decreases business profits by $30 bil-
lion per year.71
Border controls on transport create delays at customs
stations and greatly increase the cost of trade within Eu-
rope. 72 Some estimates show that it takes up to sixty-
(it See Report, supra note 12, at 8-5. Transport represents more than 7% of the
EC's gross domestic product, Id.
li" Id. "Government control is exercised through fare-setting mechanisms, the
number of routes served, and the quality of services provided." Id.
70 Id. These physical barriers cost from 7.9-8.3 billion ECUs to maintain. This
figure is attributable to the use of outside transport services, customs clearing,
transport delays, and employment. The estimated loss of business trade due to
these physical barriers ranges from 1%-3%. CLIFFORD CHANCE, supra note 11, at
11.
71 Europe 1992, supra note 3, at 42.
12 M. EMERSON, supra note 1, at 256.
1990]
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three hours to transport goods by truck over 750 miles.73
Delays at border crossings amount to 40% of truck deliv-
ery schedules. The time-consuming requirement of pay-
ing value-added taxes and receiving credits for previously
paid taxes, which must be repeated at each border cross-
ing, .causes these delays.74 Furthermore, between 25%
and 30% of all trucks on EC roads carry no cargo because
of national quota and license systems which prevent carri-
ers from seeking loads on return journeys. 75 Finally, re-
moval of frontier controls could reduce intra-EC import
prices by 1.7%.76
A. Air Transport Policies Before 1992
Air carriers in the EC combine a higher traveling speed
with avoidance of frontier border controls.77 Yet, these
two benefits alone do not offset the high prices charged
for airline travel and shipping. The airlines face stiff com-
petition for passengers on the shorter routes within the
EC from other modes of transport. 78 Intercity rail trans-
portation is highly developed and inexpensive; air trans-
port is only competitive for routes over 300 kilometers or
where natural barriers, such as mountain ranges, exist.79
For freight, road transport is the most efficient method
because official procedures cause delays in air freight
operations.80
Member States regulate air transport landing rights and
cabotage8l through either bilateral agreements between
7. Report, supra note 12, at 8-5.
74 Id.
7.5 Black, Traveling in 21st Century Europe, EUROPE, Dec. 1989, at 25.
7.1 Id. "[T]hese price reductions would be partly offset by a loss of jobs, esti-
mated for the whole Community at about 17,500 in exporting firms (employees
dealing with the formalities of customs clearance), and around 40,000 in the case
of private sector customs agents." M. EMERSON, supra note 1, at 256.
77 Dagtoglou, Air Transport and the European Community, 6 EUR. L. REV. 335, 342
(1981).
78 Air Transport: A Community Approach, BULL. EUR. COMMUNITIES (Supp. May
1979), at 31 (Memorandum of the Commission) [hereinafter Air Transport].
79 Id.
- Id.
"I "Cabotage" is defined as trade between two points within a country as op-
[56
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Member States relating to fares, capacity and access, or
through concerted practices between air carriers.8 2 Bilat-
eral agreements typically include the following provisions:
1. a listing of the freedom of the air which the parties
intend to exchange;
2. the authorized routes and gateways which may be uti-
lized by the parties to the agreement;
3. a designation of the airline carriers authorized to carry
out the traffic rights agreed upon;
4. a clause on tariffs;
5. a clause on capacity;
6. a clause outlining the legal relationships of the parties,
such as rules of arbitration.'
These bilateral agreements restrict the freedom of pro-
viding air transport services and disallow competitive
pricing regimes. Typically, the agreements fix capacity
sharing rates on a fifty-fifty basis. Each country is allowed
to carry 50% of the traffic on the routes governed by the
agreement.84 In essence, this means that only a certain
number of passenger seats may be offered on each route
so as not to exceed that Member State's allotted percent-
age of traffic.85 To compensate for violations of these ca-
pacity rights, many bilateral agreements include a clause
introducing revenue pooling if a carrier crosses the 50%
posed to trade between countries. Report, supra note 12, at 8-5; see generally Was-
senberg, EEC-Cabotage After 1992, 13 AIR LAW 282 (1988).
'2 See M. EMERSON supra note 1, at 115 (a system of around 200 separate bilat-
eral agreements exist between 22 countries within Europe).
83 Air Transport, supra note 78, at 25. For a discussion of bilateral air transport
agreements, see Gertler, Bilateral Air Transport Agreements, 42 J. AIR L. & COM. 779
(1976); Lissitzyn, Bilateral Agreements on Air Transport, 30 J. AIR L. & COM. 248
(1964). The first major post-World War II bilateral agreement was signed in 1946
between the United States and the United Kingdom. It included many of the
clauses outlined above and served as a model for subsequent agreements between
other countries.
14 Diamond, The Bermuda Agreement Revisited, 41 J. AIR L. & COM. 419, 427
(1975); see also Dempsey, Aerial Dogfights Over Europe: The Liberalization of EEC Air
Transport, 53J. AIR L. & COM. 615, 627 (1988).
85 See Comment, Introducing Competition to the European Economic Community Airline
Industry, 15 CAL. W. INT'LJ. 364, 377 (1985). If the availability of seats is limited,
the type of aircraft used for the particular flight is also limited since it would be
impracticable to fly a large aircraft with only a few passengers. Id. at 377 n.107.
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mark.86 In other words, if one carrier attracts more than
50% of the passengers or traffic in a given market, that
carrier must then share its revenue by making payment to
the designated carrier of the other Member State. These
payments include profits received in excess of their allo-
cated share.8 7 Not only is revenue pooling anti-competi-
tive, it also eliminates the incentive to increase the quality
of the air services provided, because no matter how many
passengers the airline attracts, it may only receive revenue
from its allocated share.88
Market access is also severely limited for those carriers
who are not designated carriers pursuant to the agree-
ments. Designation requires that an airline or airlines be
specifically named for the operation of agreed-upon serv-
ices. 89 The Member States, and not the airline carriers,
have the exclusive responsibility for the policy principles
of the agreements.90 The governments of the Member
States "adopt the policy of their choice as to the designa-
tion of the carriers which will exercise national rights."'
Those carriers who are not designated are denied access
and are not allowed to fly scheduled routes.
Take-off and landing slot allocation may also be viewed
as discriminatory. Smaller European carriers and newly
established carriers often complain of the allocation sys-
tem among European airports.92 Basically, the carrier is
awarded a slot within the airport if it had a slot in the pre-
vious season. With airport overcrowding on the rise, this
type of "grandfather right" typically keeps out new air-
lines or less established carriers.93
Member States impose further restrictions through li-
89; Argyris, The EEC Rules of Competition and the Air Transport Sector, 26 COMMON
MKT. L. REv. 5, 9 (1989).
87 Id.
A8 Id.
81, See Gertler, supra note 83, at 796.
1Ko J. NAVEAU, INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORTATION IN A CHANGING WORLD 94
(1989).
1" Id. at 95.
92 Argyris, supra note 86, at 29.
, Id.
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censing requirements. To obtain a license to transport
passengers and freight by air, an air carrier must receive
the approval of a specified national agency. In this way a
Member State government may further restrict
nondesignated carriers from operating within their air-
space.94 These national agencies tend to reserve the
licenses for "national airlines" only. 95
The policies of governmental protectionism, restrictive
licensing, market access, slot allocation and capacity con-
trol have all led to high fares. Air transport is therefore
available to only a small percentage of the European pop-
ulation.96 As a result, the airline industry has been char-
acterized in recent decades as a "regulatory oligopoly"
because of the limited access of new entrants or expan-
sions under governmental regulations. 97
To the contrary, recent bilateral agreements do recog-
nize "four freedoms of the air": (1) the right to fly across
the territory of a foreign country without landing; (2) the
right to land for noncommercial traffic purposes (techni-
cal operations or refueling); (3) the right to put down pas-
sengers, freight or mail in a foreign country which is a
party to the bilateral agreement; (4) the right to take on
passengers, freight or mail from a foreign country which
is a party to the bilateral agreement.98 On the other hand,
the "fifth freedom," or the right to undertake the com-
mercial air transport of passengers, freight and mail to a
third country not a party to the bilateral agreement, is not
universally recognized between Member States. 99
94 Gertler, supra note 83, at 796.
95 Air Transport, supra note 78, at 35.
9 Id. "[H]igh fares (excepting domestic flights in the United States of America,
where uninterrupted competition has kept fares comparatively low), have kept this
sophisticated network only accessible to a relatively small (albeit increasing)
number of people." Dagtoglou, supra note 77, at 337.
97 Haanappel, Air Transport Deregulation in Jurisdictions Other than the United States,
8 ANNALS OF AIR & SPACE L. 79, 80 (1988).
98 Air Transport, supra note 78, at 35.
- M. EMERSON, supra note 1, at 115; see infra note 4 and accompanying text.
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B. The Changes After 1992
Although the Treaty establishing the EC contains nu-
merous provisions relating to transport,'0 0 Article 84, par-
agraph 1, states that these provisions are applicable only
to transport by rail, road, and inland waterways.' 0l No
'- Treaty, supra note 3, arts. 74-86. Articles 85 and 86 specifically relate to
transportation competition. Article 85 states in part:
1. The following shall be deemed to be incompatible with the
Common Market and shall hereby be prohibited: any agreements
between enterprises, any decisions by associations of enterprises and
any concerted practices which are likely to affect trade between
Member States and which have as their object or result the preven-
tion, restriction or distortion of competition within the Common
Market, in particular those consisting in:
(a) the direct or indirect fixing of purchase or selling prices or of any
other trading conditions;
(b) the limitation or control of production, markets, technical devel-
opment or investment;
(c) market-sharing or the sharing of sources of supply;
(d) the application to parties to transactions of unequal terms in re-
spect of equivalent supplies, thereby placing them at a competitive
disadvantage; or
(e) the subjecting of the conclusion of a contract to the acceptance
by a party of additional supplies which, either by their nature or ac-
cording to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of
such contract.
2. Any agreements or decisio-,: prohibited pursuant to this Article
shall be null and void.
Id.
Article 86 provides:
To the extent to which trade between any Member States may be
affected thereby, action by one or more enterprises to take improper
advantage of a dominant position within the Common Market or
within a substantial part of it shall be deemed to be incompatible
with the Common Market and shall hereby be prohibited. Such im-
proper practices may, in particular, consist of:
(a) the direct or indirect imposition of any, inequitable purchase or
selling prices or of any other inequitable trading conditions;
(b) the limitation of production, markets, or technical development
to the prejudice of consumers;
(c) the application to parties to transactions of unequal terms in re-
spect of equivalent supplies, thereby placing them at a competitive
disadvantage; or
(d) the subjecting of the conclusion of a contract to the acceptance
by a party, of additional supplies which either by their nature or ac-
cording to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of
such contract.
Id.
0, Treaty, supra note 3, art. 84.
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rules for air transportation are specifically given.
In 1977 the European Council established a working
group to discuss air transportation rights under the
Treaty. °2 By 1979, the EC Commission had adopted a
Memorandum entitled "Air Transport: A Community
Approach."'' 0 3  The Commission suggested applying
Treaty competition rules to air fares and also proposed
that new airlines should be allowed to operate in the Eu-
ropean market. 10 4 The Council took no official action at
this time, due in part to the fear held by Member State
governments that national airlines would be weakened by
these proposals. 0 5 Further proposals attempting to apply
the Treaty competition rules were illustrated in the Com-
mission' s second Memorandum on air transport in 1984
entitled "Progress Towards the Development of a Com-
munity Air Transport Policy."'0 6 In this attempt, the
Commission recommended three measures on air trans-
port: (1) an advocation of the need for specific Commu-
nity regulations of the air industry; (2) a proposal to
amend machinery for the settlement of air tariffs; and (3)
a proposal to limit non-competitive bilateral
agreements. 10 7
The major European carriers responded to these at-
tempts with bitter resistance stating, "the present Euro-
pean network satisfies the vast majority of the potential
demands under present conditions."'10 8 Accordingly, the
Council took no action at that time to adopt these recom-
102 Dagtoglou, supra note 77, at 335. Pressure on the Council was initiated by
the introduction in 1977 of President Carter's deregulation of civil aviation in the
United States. Id. at 338.
10 Air Transport, supra note 78.
1- Id. at 17, 19.
105 Id. at 19; see also Note, New Frontiers in EEC Air Transport Competition, 8 Nw. J.
OF INT'L L. & Bus. 455, 461 (1987).
- Progress Towards the Development of a Community Air Transport Policy, BULL. EUR.
COMM. (Supp. March 1984) (Memorandum of the Commission).
07 Stanbrook, Progress Towards a Community Policy on Air Transport, 10 EUR. L.
REV. 52, 53 (1985).
- Dagtoglou, supra note 77, at 347-48 (citing response printed in The House
of Lords, European Air Fares at 193-99).
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mendations into regulations. 0 9
In the early 1980s there were many highly vocal advo-
cates of deregulation. One famous proponent, Sir Fred-
die Laker, sought permission from the British Civil
Aviation Authority to open several scheduled air routes in
Europe utilizing discount rates." 0 He pursued the result-
ing denial all the way to the High Court of London, argu-
ing that the Treaty competition laws superseded any
authority in the United Kingdom. Laker expected the
London court to refer the case to the European Court of
Justice for a decision that would either apply the Treaty
competition laws to air transport or reject the contention
once and for all, Before a transfer could be perfected,
however, Laker Airlines collapsed."'
The confrontation Laker sought to provoke eventually
occurred in 1986. Air France and KLM, along with
Nouvelles Frontieres and several tour operators and
travel agencies, were accused of applying tariffs other
than those approved by the civil aviation authorities in vi-
olation of the French Civil Aviation Code.' 2 The French
court requested a clarification from the ECJ to determine
whether the Treaty competition rules were compatible
- A regulation is a rule promulgated by the Council which becomes directly
binding on all Member States. Treaty, supra note 3, art. 189; see also Thieffry, Van
Doorn & Lowe, supra note 2, at 359.
"° Dagtoglou, supra note 77, at 339; see also Comment, supra note 85, at 383;
Weber, Laker Airways v. The Ten Governments of the EEC-Comments on a Pending Case,
6 ANNALS OF AIR & SPACE L. 257 (1981).
1 See Note, supra, note 105, at 456. A further attempt to curb price fixing was
made in 1982 by Lord Bethell, a British Member of Parliament. Bethell brought
suit against the European Commission for allowing violations of Article 85 of the
Treaty to continue in the airline industry. The Queen's Bench Division dismissed
the case, stating that Lord Bethell lacked standing to bring the suit. Lord Bethell
v. Commission, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8858 (1982). Had the suit been
brought by a Member State instead of an individual, standing may have been satis-
fied since suits against EC institutions for inaction are permitted under Article 175
of the Treaty. See Treaty, supra note 3, art. 175.
,1 Ministere Public v. Asjes, 3 COMMON MKT. L.R. 173 (1986) [commonly
known as Nouvelles Frontiers, hereinafter as New Frontiers]. It was alleged that the
airlines were offering lower unapproved fares, thereby undercutting airlines which
complied with French law and charged fares approved by the French Minister for
Civil Aviation. Id.
with French law." 3
The 1986 decision of the ECJ in Ministere Public v. Asjes
laid the foundation for the deregulation of the air trans-
port industry.' 4 The Court unequivocally stated that the
competition rules in Articles 85 and 86 were applicable to
the Treaty which had existed since 1957.' 15 Approval of
air fares by a Member State was found to be a direct con-
tradiction of its obligation to prohibit concerted practices
under Article 85 of the Treaty.' 1 6
Yet one question remained: whether or not the ECJ
possessed the proper authority to render judgment in this
instance. Article 84(2) states that the Council of Minis-
ters, acting unanimously, may decide whether, and to
what extent, provisions are to be laid down for sea and air
transport.' 17 Since the Council of Ministers is the only in-
stitution authorized to decide EC policy for air transport,
it was arguable that the ECJ had no authority to render a
decision applying the Treaty rules in this area. The prem-
ise of this argument arose in an earlier case, Cullet v.
LeClerc Books,' in which the ECJ stated that if no Commu-
nity policy existed by way of directive or regulation, the
Member States maintained jurisdiction to enact domestic
law on the subject. By analogy, since no policy had been
enacted by the Council, which is specifically granted such
authority in Article 84 of the Treaty, the airlines should
I I The Paris Police Court, a national court of France with criminal jurisdiction,
sought a preliminary ruling for an authoritative interpretation of the Treaty. This
type of ruling is comparable to an interlocutory appeal in the United States where
the proceedings are stayed pending determination of the issue. Note, Prospects for
European Air Deregulation, 21 INT'L LAw. 561 (1988).
114 The court began by outlining the international legal framework in which air-
lines operate, starting with the Chicago Convention and ending with an explana-
tion of the modem bilateral system. New Frontiers, supra note 112, at 180-81.
Id. at 173.
116 Id.; see also supra note 100 for the text of Article 85.
1,7 Treaty, supra note 3, art. 84(2). "The Council may, acting by means of unan-
imous vote, decide whether, to what extent and by what procedure appropriate
provisions might be adopted for sea and air transport." Id.
,,, 2 COMMON MKT L.R. 286 (1985). The court allowed the French government
to enact domestic legislation in order to maintain the resale price for books pub-
lished in France so long as no Community policy related to the pricing of books
existed. Id.
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not have been bound by the Treaty competition rules and
should have been free to enact domestic legislation on
point.
Notwithstanding the jurisdictional issue, the ECJ
started the ball rolling. By December of 1987, the LeClerc
Books analysis became moot when the EC Council took ac-
tion by issuing a series of directives applying the Treaty's
competition rules to areas such as pricing, access to
routes, and capacity sharing." 9
Directives issued by the Council, in contrast to regula-
tions promulgated by the Council, are not directly bind-
ing. The directives are treated as Council
recommendations to the Member States which must be
adopted within a stated period. 20 In order to implement
the directives, the Member States must either introduce
new domestic law, or recast or repeal their existing ad-
ministrative rules. The method of implementation is to
be chosen by the Member States, who are in the best posi-
tion to determine domestic policy and to judge how the
EC requirements can be reconciled with their own
sovereignty. 121
The Council directives on Air Transport include the lib-
"- Report, supra note 12, at 8-5.
12o EEC Competition Rules, supra note 4, at 12; see also The ABC's of Community Law,
supra note 15, at 24-26. Directives are issued at the end of a legislative process
involving both the Commission and the Council. The machinery is set into mo-
tion by a proposal stating the Commission's view of the future Community law. A
proposal is prepared by the particular department within the field; for example,
the transport department. The department report then goes before the Commis-
sion as a whole and can be adopted by a mere majority vote. From here the pro-
posal is sent to the Council with a detailed explanation of the grounds for the
decision. The European Parliament is then consulted for an advisory opinion. In
this opinion the Parliament will often suggest potential amendments to the origi-
nal proposal. After Parliament makes its suggestions, the Council may enact the
directives. Id.
12 1 The ABC's of Community Law, supra note 15, at 24-26. Further, non-applica-
tion of the directives due to domestic difficulties is impermissible even if the diffi-
culty is a question of national constitutionality. Thieffry, Van Doorn, & Lowe,
supra note 2, at 360. After the time for incorporation into the national laws has
expired and the Member States have not taken effective measures, Community
citizens will be allowed to invoke the directive or recommendation directly
through the ECJ. The ABC's of Community Law, supra note 15, at 26.
[56
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eralization of access to routes. 22 Capacity sharing be-
tween national carriers of the Member States may now
range from a 45%-55% basis in the first year of the agree-
ment to a 40%-60% basis in the second year.2M Further-
more, airline passenger rates will receive automatic
approval by the government if the prices are set within the
agreed-upon limits.' 2 4 Carriers who prove that fully allo-
cated costs justify a fare below the governmental limit can
force a Member State's government into arbitration for
the refusal to allow the lower fare. 2 5
Anticompetitive behavior by formal or informal agree-
ment resulting in the prevention, restriction or distortion
of competition is now prohibited within the Commu-
nity. 2 6 This restriction does not, however, include paral-
lel price increases because such increases may also be the
result of independent business decisions or unknown fac-
tors. 27 The Treaty competition rules are not intended to
nullify cooperative undertakings. Articles 85 and 86 per-
mit various other joint ventures in the areas of advertising
and credit rating, and research and development. 1 2
2 Report, supra note 12, at 8-5. "[M]ultiple carriers [may] serve a market in
the first year of the agreement, when the number of passengers reaches 250,000
per year. In the second year, this threshold will decrease to 200,000 or 1,500
flights; in the third year, to 180,000 passengers, or 1,000 flights. The access pro-
vision also provides for the right to serve more than one point on the same route,
such as Rome to London to Frankfurt." Id.
"2, Formerly, capacity sharing between national carriers had to be maintained
on a 50-50% basis. Id.
124 Id. See also D. GOYDER, EEC COMPETITION LAW 360 (1988).
For example, Article 3 of the Directive sets out the criteria which
[civil aviation] authorities are to apply in approving fares, including
the interests of consumers: consultation on fares, tariffs and condi-
tion of carriage (of both passengers and baggage) between airlines
are only allowed so long as they do not lead to binding agreements,
and are open to attendance by both the Commission and relevant
Member States.
Id.
Id25 Id.; see also Sorensen, Air Deregulation Means Lower Fares and More Competition,
Europe, May 1988, at 25.
121 Treaty, supra note 3, art. 85.
27 Dempsey, supra note 84, at 643.
121 Treaty, supra note 3, art. 86. The Commission has further stated that EC
policy recognizes 18 types of agreements that do not violate the competition
rules:
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The directives do not entirely remove the Member
States' jurisdiction to regulate competition. Deregulation
is to take place under a "phasing plan" in which member
states will maintain some degree of control until 1992.129
The intent of the Council is to eliminate this phasing situ-
ation by the end of 1992 and replace it with a liberalized
regime under which the Member State's control will be
substantially curtailed. 130
The first liberalization package utilized temporary ex-
emptions to constrain the applications of the competition
rules.'' These exemptions are issued by the European
Commission in order to alleviate the harshness of an ex-
treme and sudden deregulation. Exemptions are allowed
[1] an exchange of opinion or experience;
[2] joint comparative studies of enterprises or industries;
[3] joint preparation of statistics and calculation models;
[4] joint market research;
[5] cooperation in accounting matters;
[6] joint provisions of credit guarantees;
[7] joint debt-collecting associations;
[8] joint business or tax consultant agencies;
[9] joint implementation of research and development contracts;
[10] joint implementation of research and development projects;
[11] joint placing of research and development contracts;
[12] sharing out of research and development contracts;
[131 joint use of production, storage, and transport equipment;
[14] joint execution of orders (but only when the participants do not
compete with each other as regard[ing] the work to be done);
[15] joint selling arrangements by non-competing firms;
[16] joint after-sales and repairs services when the participants are
non-competing firms, or, even if they are competitors, when these
services are provided by an undertaking independent of them;
[17] joint advertising (but no restriction is allowed the participants
also to advertise independently);
[18] joint quality marks (but only where the label is available to all
competitors on the same conditions).
EEC Competition Rules, supra note 4, at 22-23.
12' Id. The concept of "phasing" in competition is due in part to the disfavor of
American style deregulation: "We refuse to bring about this sort of market free
for all. Conditions in the United States are quite different from those in the Com-
munity; the U.S. has different social, economic, and fiscal laws; the U.S. govern-
ment takes a relaxed view about the fate of any one of its national carriers."
Remarks of Commissioner Davis, Sept. 11, 1985, reprinted in 4 Common Mkt Rep.
(CCH) 10726 (1985).
'" See D. GOYDER, supra note 124.
1-1 Argyris, supra note 86, at 19.
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in the areas of slot allocation, computer reservation sys-
tems, revenue pooling and capacity.1 2 The issuance of
these exemptions is conditional on a number of items
such as voluntary participation by airlines, revenue pool-
ing limits of 1 %, and the ability to withdraw from capacity
agreements upon three months' notice if the carrier
desires.1 3 3 These temporary exemptions must end by the
132 Id. at 19-21.
" See Dempsey, supra note 84, at 706, Appendix B. The conditions on exemp-
tions are as follows:
-joint planning and co-ordination of the capacity to be provided on
scheduled air services, insofar as it helps to ensure a spread of serv-
ices at the less busy times of the day or during less busy periods or
on less busy routes, so long as any partner may withdraw without
penalty from such agreements, decisions or concerted practices, and
is not required to give more than three months' notice of its inten-
tion not to participate in such joint planning and coordination for
future seasons;
-sharing of revenue from scheduled air services, so long as the trans-
fer does not exceed 1 % of the poolable revenue earned on a particu-
lar route by the transferring partner, no costs are shared or accepted
by the transferring partner and the transfer is made in compensation
for the loss incurred by the receiving partner in scheduling flights at
less busy times of the day or during less busy periods;
-consultants for common preparation of proposals on tariffs, fares
and conditions for the carriage of passengers and baggage on sched-
uled services, on condition that Fonsultations on this matter are vol-
untary, that air carriers will not be bound by their results and that
the Commission and the Member States whose air carriers are con-
cerned may participate as observers in any such consultations;
-slot allocation at airports and airport scheduling, on condition that
the air carriers concerned shall be entitled to participate in such ar-
rangements, that the national and multilateral procedures for such
arrangements are transparent and that they take into account any
constraints and distribution rules defined by national or interna-
tional authorities and any rights which air carriers may have histori-
cally acquired;
-common purchase, development and operation of computer reser-
vation systems relating to timetabling, reservations and ticketing by
air transport undertakings, on condition that air carriers of Member
States have access to such systems on equal terms, that participating
carriers have their services listed on a non-discriminatory basis and
also that any participant may withdraw from the system on giving
reasonable notice;
-technical and operational ground handling at airports, such as air-
craft push back, refuelling, cleaning and security;
-handling of passengers, mail freight and baggage at airports;
-services for the provision of in-flight catering.
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end of the phasing period absent any revisions by the
Council.13
4
In Luxembourg, on June 18, 1990, the second phase of
the liberalization plan was announced. 135 Under this
plan, bilateral revenue and capacity sharing agreements
are to be phased out by the end of 1992.136 Currently,
governments are allowed a 60%-40% share of capacity
divided between the national carriers of the two states
which are parties to the bilateral agreement. These limits
will be reduced through 7-1/2 percentage point stages
until a 75%-25% share is reached in 1992.' 7
The package also allows for a more flexible "deep dis-
count" fare, which can be offered by the airlines without
recourse to the Member State's government. 38 In addi-
tion, from 1992 on, an airline's request for a cheaper gen-
eral fare will be blocked only if both governments
disapprove,' 39 as opposed to only one government disap-
proving as it stands today. Further, fifth freedom rights 40
are to be extended to allow 50% of all seats sold on an
airline, to contain a "fifth freedom" passenger as com-
pared to 30% at the moment.' 4'
The plan did not, however, address the issue of slot al-
location. 42 Increasing competition will be difficult if air-
lines cannot obtain a landing or take-off slot due to the
"grandfather rights" system which is now in place. 43 In
1.4 Argyris, supra note 86, at 19. These temporary exemptions will continue
through the second phase of liberalzation under the 1990 plan. IATA 1989 AN-
NUAL REPORT (1990).
1. Dickson, If You Want Cheap Air Travel in the EC, Don't Board Yet, Fin. Times,




Betts & Dickson, Why Open Skies Are Under Threat, Fin. Times, June 18, 1990,
at 18.
140 Id.; for a definition of fifth freedom rights see supra note 99 and accompany-
ing text.
14, A fifth freedom passenger is one who is picked up or set down at an interme-
diate airport en route to another destination. Dickson, supra note 136, at 2.
142 Id.
,4. Opening Skies in Europe, Fin. Times, June 20, 1990, at 26.
the wake of this silence, the EC Commission is consider-
ing a proposal which entails putting airport slots up for
"auction" on a rotating basis. Yet the EC recognizes that
the larger airlines must be restricted through antitrust
laws from monopolizing the slots by "out-bidding" the
smaller carriers. 44
This second plan is not radically different from the first
deregulation plan implemented in 1987. The most im-
portant aspect appears merely to be the EC transport
ministers' commitment to a completely deregulated air in-
dustry by 1992. 4 1 If nothing else, the June 18, 1990
meeting in Luxembourg will show the national airlines
that the Council means business, so to speak, and has
every intention of implementing free competition in the
industry.
The previous section of this comment discussed the ef-
fects of the deregulation within the EC. It is even more
uncertain how deregulation will affect countries who are
not members of the EC. This new regime of deregulation
has led nonmember states to express concern that the
common market or unified position will be accompanied
by EC protectionism against outsiders in place of the
traditional nationalistic protectionism. 46 Effectively, the
EC may dissolve the twelve Member States' cartels, while
at the same time building a new solidified cartel which




1' Thieffry, Van Doom & Lowe, supra note 2, at 358. For a discussion of the
concept of a "Fortress Europe" see Europe 1992, supra note 3, at 43; see also,
Tordijman, 1992: A Real Opportunity For America, Com. News, May 1989, at I
(Newsletter of the Dallas-Ft. Worth Chapter of the French-American Chamber of
Commerce in the United States) stating:
[it] would be absurd for the Community to lean towards protection-
ism .... The Community does not intend to increase existing protec-
tion. Its internal market will not close in on itself. The E.C. can only
expect growth of trade and employment resulting from the single
market if it remains open to others. It is committed to do so and will
meet its international obligations in that respect.
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Such anticompetitive behavior directed toward non-
member states would be considered violative of the
Treaty only if it "affects trade" between the Member
States. 4 7 In other words, anticompetitive behavior be-
tween Member States and nonmember states is permitted
unless an anticompetitive effect can be proven within the
EC borders. 148 The EC Commission takes the view that
tariff agreements between nonmember states and Mem-
ber States do affect trade within the EC's borders. The
Commission also admits that such an effect will be difficult
to establish. ' 49 Therefore, the question of whether or not
the competition rules will be applied against the existing
agreements with nonmember states remains unknown.
United States airlines have developed a conservative
strategy due to the uncertainty of the non-member states'
position in Europe after 1992.150 Airlines such as Ameri-
can and- Northwest are establishing new flights to the EC
in order to secure their respective position before
1992.'1 t The concern of non-member states seems to be
that the new EC economic force will cut into the historical
profits the nonmember carriers have received in a frag-
mented economy.
C. Cooperation by the Member States
The 1987 directives and the 1990 plan are the first
steps in achieving a liberalized international air market.
Obtaining Member State cooperation is a more difficult
task. The EC has limited enforcement powers. First, if
the parties are involved in a lawsuit with respect to an
agreement which violates the competition rules of the
Treaty, a national court of the Member State can declare
the agreement null and void. 152 Second, the Commission
,4 Treaty, supra note 3, art. 86.
'14 Id.; see also Dempsey, supra note 84, at 643.
,49 New Frontiers, supra note 112, at 189.
1 50 McKenna, U.S. Airlines Establish New European Flights Before 1992 Marketing Re-
structuring, Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., Nov. 20, 1989, at 79-80.
151 Id.
,52 EEC Competition Rules, supra note 4, at 17.
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has the power to order the parties to terminate the illegal
conduct and the Commission may impose a fine. 5 3 Real-
istically, there is little threat of punitive action since the
Commission is made up of delegates from each Member
State whose government generally owns a significant por-
tion of the airline subject to the fine. 54
The adoption of these directives by the Member States
creates a peculiar problem due to the foundations of civil
aviation law in national sovereignty dating back to the
Chicago Convention of 1944.155 The European air indus-
try has been further shaped by the International Air
Transport Association (IATA), which represents over
one-hundred countries including all of the EC Member
States except Luxembourg. 5 6 Principally, the IATA co-
ordinates air tariffs between international airlines, subject
of course, to approval by the participating governments.
This keeps competition at a minimum and fares exorbi-
tant. 57 The IATA also performs a consulting function
and its recommendations are regularly adopted by its
members. 58
The implementation of the EC directives is further
complicated since most Member States operate a national
airline which dominates the market within their coun-
try.' 59 A national airline has been characterized as the
' Id. The fine may be up to one million ECUs or 10% of the annual turnover
of the undertakings concerned. These fines are paid to the treasury for the Com-
mission's budget and not to the party injured by the anticompetitive behavior. Id.
154 See infra note 159 and accompanying text.
,,, Chicago Convention, Dec. 7, 1944, T.I.A.S. No. 6605, 15 U.N.T.S. 295
[hereinafter Chicago Convention]; see also Air Transport, supra note 78, at 24.
156 Id. at 25. The IATA maintains 158 active members and 33 associate mem-
bers. Only some of these members participate in tariff coordination. For a listing
of airlines who do not participate, see IATA Membership, REVIEW, Feb. 1990, at 31.
,17 Id.; see also Note, supra note 105, at 459.
15 Dagtoglou, supra note 77, at 343. For a more detailed discussion of Euro-
pean air transport organizations such as the IATA, the European Civil Aviation
Conference, and Association of European Airlines, see Dempsey, supra note 84, at
623 -29.





618 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [56
"flag carrier that can lend wings to national feelings."'"
When a government is setting policies in the areas of taxa-
tion or the availability of credit, it distinguishes between
carriers on the basis of nationality and not upon perform-
ance-related factors such as economic efficiency, quality
or services provided.1 6' The nationality of airlines is an
important part of international air services, 162 so much so,
that Member States will often maintain an unprofitable
carrier as a symbol of the flag.'6 3 Further, the national
carriers are frequently overstaffed by national union work-
ers164 who might look with political disfavor upon a gov-
ernmental regime which reduces their jobs. The success
or failure of deregulation may turn upon the Member
States' willingness to curb their own governmental inter-
est in maintaining the current system.
The collective response of airline carriers to date has
been one of resistance and fear. ' 65 The public authorities
may be reluctant to "whole-heartedly accept the competi-
tion-concept for transport."' 166 Business enterprises may
resist putting their faith and finances into a competitive
regime based on EC policy which has yet to be imple-







Air Transport, supra note 78, at 35. In contrast, United States airlines have always
been privately owned. Haanappel, supra note 97, at 96.
-o Dagtoglou, supra note 77, at 343 (the progress of the national airline is often
projected as a symbol for the entire country).
"! Gertler, Nationality of Air Lines: A Hidden Force in the International Air Regulation
Equation, 48J. AIR L. & COM. 51, 77 (1982).
162 Id. at 54.
163 H. WASSENBERGH, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORTATION LAW IN A
NEW ERA 140 (1976).
"" Dagtoglou, supra note 77, at 340.
"'5 European Airlines Discuss Joining Forces, Wall St.J.,June 10, 1987, at 24, col. 2.
I" P. SLOT & M. VAN DER WOUDE, EXPLOITING THE INTERNAL MARKET: CO-OPER-
ATION AND COMPETITION TOWARD 1992, at 17 (1988).
167 Id.
COMMENTS
To put it bluntly, it frequently is more rewarding in com-
petition terms to have the ear of the transport-ministry
than to cut prices (supposing the latter is allowed at
all).... [E]nterprises in that sector [transport] may not be
expected to support implementation of an EEC competi-
tion law the actual impact of which in practice is very un-
certain indeed.
168
Germany and France are the focal points of resistance
to the EC air transport policy. 169 Sitting at the geographic
heart of the EC, these two Member States have the least to
gain from reduced air rates since surface transport such as
road and railway carriage provide an adequate mode for
passengers and freight. 170
A recent example of French resistance involved the
United Kingdom charter airline, Air Europe. The airline
was told by the French government, attempting to protect
Air France, that the British charter airline would have to
charge a one way fare from London to Paris of eighty-five
francs instead of the offered fifty-nine francs. Air Europe
refused. The airline's chairman, Harry C. Goodman, an-
nounced that he would be on board the first scheduled
flight to personally hand out cash refunds to the passen-
gers after landing in Paris. The French government then
retorted that if Mr. Goodman acted in such a bold man-
ner, Air Europe would be denied landing rights in Paris.
Air Europe replied that it was free to give money away to
whomever it wanted-whenever it wanted. On this occa-
sion, however, the airline was willing to abandon the idea
for fear of incurring the further wrath of the French
government. 17'
Airline resistance may come under the guise of the
Treaty itself. A total exemption, in contrast to the tempo-
rary exemptions mentioned earlier, may exist for national
1 - Id.
16:, Barrett, Dogfight over Europe, MGMT. TODAY, April 1988, at 93, 101.
170 Id.
1' Id. at 93.
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carriers under Article 90(2) of the Treaty. 72 This article
is the so-called "public enterprise" exemption under
which Treaty competition rules are applied to govern-
ment undertakings only if they do not impair the public
duties of that enterprise.'17 Because of the public nature
of the national carriers, 74 these airlines could argue that
the competition rules will impair their public duties. This
argument could be based upon the premise that airlines
were never intended to serve the majority of the public.
More specifically, mass passenger transportation can be,
and is, effectively done by the rail industry. Furthermore,
by forcing this new passenger oriented system upon the
airlines their traditional function has been changed. For
example, the interposition of competition affects the
Member States' ability to determine which mode of trans-
port is best suited for the movement of their population,
although to date no major European carrier has urged
this position. As it stands, the ECJ has left open a possi-
ble exemption under Article 90(2) but stated that the
Treaty provisions would be "interpreted strictly," there-
fore making the exemption's success unlikely. 75
D. The Problems of Congestion and Air Traffic Control
In addition to governmental resistance, the increasing
problem of congested airports and the outdated Euro-
,72 Treaty, supra note 3, art. 90(2). Article 90(2) provides:
Any enterprise charged with the management of services of general
economic interest or having the character of a fiscal monopoly shall
be subject to the rules contained in this Treaty, in particular to those
governing competition, to the extent that the application of such
rules does not obstruct the dejure or defacto fulfillment of the specific
tasks entrusted to such enterprise. The development of trade may
not be affected to such a degree as would be contrary to the interests
of the Community.
ld.
73 Note, supra note 105, at 472.
174 See supra note 159 and accompanying text discussing the degree of govern-
ment ownership in airline carriers.
17-5 See New Frontiers, supra note 112, at 187. Whether "Article 90(2) of the
Treaty allows the airline to be given special treatment is a question which can be
left open .... Id. For the view that the European national airlines are a public
undertaking, see Dagtoglou, supra note 77, at 346.
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pean air traffic control system could halt deregulation
before it gets started. 176 The number of annual airline
passengers in Europe is expected to double to approxi-
mately 800 million by the year 2000.177 An increase in the
number of passengers will most certainly necessitate an
increase in the number of flights available in Europe.
This increase will particularly limit the number of take off
and landing slots available at European airports and may
effectively preclude many carriers from obtaining such
slots.
The national airlines, being the only ones that can ob-
tain slots, will effectively control the Member States' air-
ports as "hubs." The practical effect of this dominance
will be decreased competition and higher fares. A United
States Department of Transportation study published in
February 1990, for example, showed that when one air-
line commanded more than 75% of the traffic in an air-
port, fares were 18.7% higher. 78 Unless the national
airlines are willing to share airport capacity, deregulation
may have no chance of success.
The problem of airport congestion is exacerbated by
the significant amount of airspace dedicated to military
operations. ' 79 As it stands, designated airspace cannot be
used by civilian aircraft. One solution to the congestion
problem would be to free up some of this airspace for pri-
vate aircraft. Yet, if political tensions in the Middle East
and Southwest Asia continue to increase, this seems
unlikely.
According to an IATA-commissioned report, France,
Germany, Greece, Spain and the United Kingdom will
suffer most from air congestion problems. 18 0 In response
to the congestion problems and this report, the IATA has
,76 Will Europe's Crowded Airports Strangle Competition at Birth?, THE ECONOMIST,
Apr. 14, 1990, at 69 [hereinafter Crowded Airports].
,17 Delays Across Europe, THE ECONOMIST, May 12, 1990, at 20.
178 See Crowded Airports, supra note 176, at 69.
,79 Young, What Will Be the Effects of the EC Market Unification on Intercontinental Air
Services after 1992?, ICAO J., Jan. 1990, at 27.
- Congestion-IATA Seeks Public Support, REVIEW, Feb. 1990, at 4.
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launched an international campaign to publicize the effect
of congestion in the hope that it will foster greater airline
cooperation. This report warns that by the year 2000 the
restrictions on airspace will cost Western European coun-
tries as much as ten billion dollars.' 8'
Moreover, the air traffic control system in Europe is
inefficient and outdated. 82 European computers and ra-
dar systems work on different standards and therefore in-
formation can not be automatically transmitted. To date,
all communications between European airports is done by
telephone. 83
The purpose of any air traffic control system is to keep
air carriers from bumping into one another. Without an
efficient control system all aircraft must be kept eighty
miles apart.'84 This adds to congestion and causes in-
creased delays. Furthermore, a single air traffic control
system is unlikely if the Member State governments insist
on continuing to control traffic through their own na-
tional public utilities.' 85 As discussed earlier, Member
States may be as reluctant to give up their national public
utilities as to give up their airlines.
IV. Is DEREGULATION SUCH A GOOD IDEA AFTER ALL?
A. Arguments Against Deregulation
First, deregulation opponents have stated that a freely
competitive system may decrease safety in the aviation in-
dustry.'8 6 The argument is premised on the view that
competition will place airlines under pressure to econo-
mize, resulting in lower safety standards. As long as fares
are kept high, it is arguable that airlines will be able to
maintain requisite safety levels because the airlines will
1', Id. at 3.
182 Id.
18-1 See Delays Across Europe, supra note 177, at 20.
184 Id.
'H Id.
8 Dagtoglou, supra note 77, at 343; see also Weber, Air Transport in the Common




still possess the cash flow to make repairs. Further, as
small operators take over the routes traditionally reserved
for the larger airlines, the increased traffic, coupled with
the limited technical capacity of the smaller airplanes,
could increase flying risks considerably.18 7
The United States experience with deregulation is often
used to refute this argument.'8 8 For example, the re-
quired level of safety is maintained by government control
on the technical side, instead of the pricing side, through
the use of organizations such as the National Transporta-
tion Safety Board.8 9 In fact, this system is already partly
in place in Europe. The IATA, as well as coordinating the
airline pricing cartel, supervises the national civil aviation
agencies' safety regulations in order to coordinate and en-
sure that safety is maintained in a time of increasing air
traffic.' 90 After deregulation, the IATA could still play an
important role in European air transport by regulating
safety on the technical side just as the NTSB supervises
air traffic safety in the United States.
Second, deregulation may prove troublesome because
open competition does not fit the ideological concepts of
air transport in Europe. The air transport policy of Eu-
rope often has socialistic undertones, due to the transport
sector being viewed as a public commodity.' 91 This may
not be compatible with the open competition, or "survival
of the fittest," method of deregulated mass passenger
transport. The protection of other methods of mass
transportation through cross-subsidy programs may be
jeopardized. For example, leisure travel in Europe is gen-
erally maintained through the railway system. 92 Open
competition in the air transport sector may diminish the
,81 Dagtoglou, supra note 77, at 344. These smaller airlines are "commuter air-
lines" which would take over the routes abandoned by big airlines after those
routes became unprofitable. Id.
,"' Weber, supra note 186, at 300.
1 Id.
.. Dagtoglou, supra note 77, at 343.
Id. at 344.
'1"2 Air Transport, supra note 78, at 31.
1990] 623
624 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [56
traditionally large number of passengers serviced by Eu-
ropean trains. Specifically, many of those who would or-
dinarily travel by train may elect to travel by air. The
result would be lower profits for the railroad industry as
well as possible loss of jobs for rail employees.
Further problems may arise with regard to the relation-
ship of the Treaty with pre-existing treaties entered into
by Member States, such as the Chicago Convention.19 3
Article 234 of the Treaty deals directly with the hierarchy
of obligations each Member State has to nonmembers
under treaties entered into before 1950. It also details
the obligations each Member State has to the European
Community. Specifically, Article 234 establishes the gen-
eral rule that prior treaties between one or more Member
States shall not be affected by the Treaty of Rome. A ca-
veat, however, further states that if the prior treaties are
incompatible with the Member State's duties under the
EC, Community law defeats the pre-existing
agreements. 94
If the trend under the new European airline deregula-
tion is away from nationalized sovereign power over air-
space, the Chicago Convention may be construed as
incompatible. In particular, Article 6 of the Convention
strictly preserves national sovereignty: "[N]o scheduled
international air service may be operated over or into the
territory of a contracting state, except with special permis-
19, Id.
-" Treaty, supra note 3, art. 234. Art. 234 provides:
The rights and obligations resulting from conventions concluded.
prior to the entry into force of this Treaty between one or more
Member States, on the one hand, and one or more third countries,
on the other hand, shall not be affected by the provisions of this
Treaty.
Insofar as such conventions are not compatible with this Treaty,
the Member State or States concerned shall take all appropriate
steps to eliminate any incompatibility found to exist. Member States
shall, if necessary, assist each other in order to achieve this purpose
and shall, where appropriate, adopt a common attitude.
sion."'195 Governments, under the theory of sovereignty,
gained economic control over air transport pursuant to
their own national, not international, interest. Air routes
and traffic were originally viewed under the Chicago Con-
vention as a "potential commodity" or natural resource of
the state to be granted or exchanged for the countries'
own economic benefit. 96 Strict national control, not free-
dom of the skies, was the underlying theme of the Con-
vention. 97 In fact, many feel that the lack of early
progress in the air transport industry was due to the
Treaty's draftsmen's inability to design an air transport
policy benefiting the EC while maintaining the integrity of
the pre-existing treaties. 98
The compatibility of the Chicago Convention and the
Treaty of Rome has never been brought before the
ECJ,199 although the court has addressed questions of
compatibility between the Treaty of Rome and other pre-
existing treaties outside the air transport sector. 00 The
court has held that "the EEC Treaty takes precedence
over the agreements concluded between Member States
prior to its coming into force."'2 0' Under this decision and
article 234, Member States may only honor their obliga-
tions under the Chicago Convention if they are construed
as compatible. If they are not, the Member State must at-
tempt to eliminate these incompatibilities; 20 2 the most
likely method would be renegotiation of the existing bilat-
195 Balfour, Freedom to Provide Air Transport Services in the EEC, 14 EUR. L. REv. 30,
43 (1989). Chicago Convention, supra note 155 at 4.
'. Gertler, supra note 161, at 55.
197 Id. at 54.
19 Dempsey, supra note 84, at 639.
1- Balfour, supra note 195, at 43.
-0 EC Commission v. Italy, I Common Mkt. L.R. 187, 188 (1962); see also A-G
v. Burgoa, 2 COMMON MKT. L.R. 193 (1981) (Spanish fisherman was prosecuted
for violating the 200 mile exclusive economic zone of Ireland. The fisherman
pleaded that the 1964 London Fisheries Convention maintained a 12 mile zone
and this right was solidified under article 234 of the Treaty, if it was found to be
comparable. The ECJ agreed.); Balfour, supra note 195, at 43.
201 New Frontiers, supra note 112, at 189.
-2' Balfour, supra note 195, at 44.
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eral agreements. °3
The French, Italian and Dutch governments have stated
that they have not found it necessary to revise their rele-
vant bilateral agreements because the question of compat-
ibility has not yet arisen.2 °4 The air carriers are taking a
similar position. Air France and KLM have stated that un-
til it becomes clear that the competition rules are incom-
patible, Member States are under no obligation to
renegotiate the existing agreements.2 5  Even though
Member States are under no obligation to renegotiate,
they may if they so desire. For example, the United King-
dom has already taken steps to eliminate potential incom-
patibilities with existing bilateral agreements.20 6 In the
future, however, it is uncertain if each Member State will
be allowed to renegotiate or if in the interest of the com-
munity the task will be relegated to the EC
Commission. °7
Fourth, even if the regulatory oligopoly is broken, de-
regulation opponents point to the potential for the forma-
tion of another type of oligopoly-the natural oligopoly.
Through airline mergers, take-overs, acquisitions and
bankruptcies, "the world may be ruled by a limited
number of mega carriers. "208 In fact, the scenario of
widespread business failures coupled with large scale in-
dustry mergers came true in less than ten years after the
inception of United States deregulation. There are now
only eight major carriers remaining in the United
211. New Frontiers, supra note 112, at 189.
24 The airlines seem to suggest that the issue should be resolved either by the
ECJ or the Commission. In the meantime, the status quo should be maintained.
See generally id.
20-5 Id.; see also Dempsey, supra note 84.
206 Haanappel, supra note 97, at 104.
207 Id. at 81.
20A Id. at 80. Many acquisitions are prompted by business failures due to the
fact that it is less expensive to purchase an ailing carrier than to buy new aircraft.
Further, the new carrier takes over the ailing carrier's gates, airport slots and pos-
sibly the ailing carrier's CRS. One example of an empire largely built on take-
overs of business failures in the United States is the former Texas Air
Corporation, now Continental Airlines Holdings, Inc. Id. at 83.
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States. 20 9 This reduction in number creates a type of nat-
ural oligopoly formed from "survival of the fittest." What
necessarily makes one oligopoly better than the other?
A fifth concern has also been expressed in the area of
international terrorism.1 0 In addition to ending border
controls and border checks, all EC airtrips will be treated
as domestic flights with no controls on arriving passen-
gers. Some authorities fear that international terrorism
will increase when only one surveillance check is con-
ducted at the EC external borders instead of periodic
checks at internal borders. Robert Kupperman, a senior
analyst of International Studies at Georgetown University,
stated recently that "it is inevitable that there will be a
major terrorist incident" when the European barriers
come down.2 "
Terrorism, conflicts with pre-existing treaties, the ideo-
logical concept of air transport in Europe and the safety
factor are all legitimate concerns within a deregulated sys-
tem. To what extent these factors will be realized is un-
known. International terrorism or civil aviation safety, for
example, may remain unaffected. Yet, deregulation oppo-
nents present a strong "what if" argument which war-
rants concern within the air transport sector. It is
possible that no change may be better than the possibility
of a change for the worse.
B. The Need for a Common Air Transport Policy
The concerns of deregulation advocates, however, are
equally compelling. Aeropolitically, the Member States of
the EC are lagging behind the international air market.212
209 The eight major airlines in the United States are: Continental Airlines Hold-
ings Inc., United Air Lines, Inc., American Airlines, Inc., Delta Air Lines, Inc.,
Northwest Airlines, Inc., USAir, Trans World Airlines, Inc. and Pan American
World Airways, Inc. Id. at 82 n.7.
210 See A Europe Free of Barriers Also Threatens to Ease Travel by Terrorists, Some Fear,
Wall St.J., Aug. 9, 1988, at 24, col. 4.
211 Id.
212 See M. EMERSON, supra note 1, at 116. During the period 1978-82 the cost of
European based international air services was, on average, 60% higher than inter-
national air services in North America. Administrative overheads were 365%
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A mutually agreeable common air transport policy would
provide a stronger international air carrier position for
Europe.21 s It would also further the interest of the Euro-
pean traveling and shipping public,21 4 prevent wasteful
competition between air carriers, 2 5 and expedite the de-
velopment of the European aircraft manufacturing indus-
try. 16  Airline deregulation may be the key to
"popularizing" the common market scheme by showing a
tangible benefit to the citizens of the Member States in
the form of less expensive and more convenient air
transport.21 7
An example of such a tangible benefit arose out of the
implementation of regional liberalization in Ireland. In
1986, the Irish government authorized a new private air-
line to fly the Dublin/London route. The new airline sub-
stantially reduced the fare previously charged by the
national carrier. In order to compete, the national carrier
also lowered its fare on the route. The competition in-
creased traffic by 29% or 200,000 extra passengers be-
tween May and December. According to a survey
conducted in late 1986, 30% of passengers on board
these flights indicated they were traveling entirely as a re-
sult of the lower fare.218 This competition has turned the
Dublin-London route into one of the best-served Euro-
pean routes in the 1990s.2 1 9
higher, unadjusted maintenance costs were 119% higher and ground/passenger
costs were 315% higher. Id.
211- Civil aviation integration may cure the situation of a divided Europe. As it
stands, air transport in the Community is at the mercy of power blocs such as the
U.S., U.S.S.R., the Arab world, China and Japan.- See H. WASSENBERGH, supra note
163, at 137.
214 Id.
2 I Id.; see also M. EMERSON, supra note 1, at 116 (showing that almost 50% of the
available seats on European airliners have flown empty).
2 o H. WASS1ENBERGH, supra note 163, at 137.
217 Barrett, supra note 169, at 96. A recent survey shows Europeans favor de-
regulation by a margin of five to one. Interestingly, North Americans who have
experienced deregulation favor it only 1.8 to one. Haanappel, supra note 97, at
99.
219 M. EMERSON, supra note 1, at 117.
219 Betts & Dickson, supra note 139, at 18.
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The creation of a single EC airline carrier is one poten-
tial way of achieving a unified air transport system. Each
of the established airlines, by agreement, could distribute
established routes equally under the direction of a com-
mon civil aviation authority.2 ° It has been suggested,
however, that a unified airline is hardly an acceptable al-
ternative. Creating one or two designated European car-
riers leading to a loss of identity of the existing carriers,
"politically, economically and psychologically seems un-
desirable in practice." 221
In 1951, several countries attempted a unified air trans-
port system, commonly known as the "Air Union" pro-
ject.22 2 The Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium, Italy
and France were to form an association creating a com-
mon European airspace and a single airline system, pre-
sumably eliminating competition and national images.
Capacity was to be allocated among the airlines by agreed
quotas. Yet, over the next decade negotiations did not
proceed smoothly and the concept began to, weaken polit-
ically. France formally withdrew from the project when
President De Gaulle issued a formal veto of the associa-
tion. By 1966, the other Member States had lost interest
in the idea as well,223 although the possibility still remains
that the Air Union or a similar project may be resurrected
in the future.
A more realistic approach might entail a series of merg-
ers and acquisitions of existing airline carriers to create
several strengthened European carriers.224 It has been
predicted that only five or six European carriers will sur-
vive the increased competition arising from deregula-
220 For an "arbitrary" example of a potential labor distribution arrangement
between the national carriers, see H. WASSENBERGH, supra note 163, at 138.
221 Id.
222 J. NAVEAU, supra note 90, at 181-83.
223 Id.
224 "No European carrier is large enough to resist the U.S. challenge." Carey,
European Airlines Discuss Joining Forces, Wall St.J.,June 10, 1987, at 24, col. 2 (state-
ment made by a representative of Alitalia).
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tion.2 25  Deregulation advocates view the natural
oligopoly as having a positive effect on the air transport
industry.
European carriers have begun discussing mergers to
enhance access to continental hubs and increase capi-
tal.226 In addition, some mergers have already taken
place. British Airways has acquired British Caledonian,
and Scandinavian Airlines System (SAS) has purchased
British Midland. 2 " On the other hand, Air France,
although acknowledging the merger concept, has taken
no official steps toward this end.22 8
Interestingly, the recent merger trends are directly cor-
related to the percentage of government ownership in the
airline carriers. For example, Air France is over 98% gov-
ernment owned, while SAS is 50% government owned,
and British Airways is completely privatized. Those air-
lines that have a greater proportion of government own-
ership have been less likely to enter into merger
negotiations. The reason for this correlation could be
that the governmental mind-set is biased toward public
service, while airline carriers tend to be profit oriented.2 9
Governments favor cooperation only if it improves the na-
tional carrier's share of international traffic or if coopera-
tion improves "public" transportation. To the contrary,
air carriers as business enterprises cooperate in hopes of
improving their profits by increasing revenues and de-
creasing costs. 23 0 Airlines which are not wholly govern-
ment owned have more shareholders to satisfy. As a
result they have more to lose from increased competition
and may be more likely to enter into negotiations on the
22 Id. (statement made by Jan Carlson, president of Scandinavian Airlines
System).
226 Id.
227 Young, supra note 179 at 28. SAS has already been successful in achieving
cooperation between carriers of different nationalities, i.e., Denmark, Norway and
Sweden. Dagtoglou, supra note 77, at 343.
228 Carey, supra note 224, at 24.
229 H. WASSENBERGH, supra note 163, at 135.
230 Id.
matter.21 This fear of competition is one possible expla-
nation for SAS's willingness and Air France's resistance to
enter into negotiations for a merger.
The merger proposal, or consolidation of all European
carriers, is likely if the major European airline carriers
view profit as the incentive. As a part of this process, Eu-
ropean countries will have to release a portion of their
sovereignty as symbolized by their national carriers. As
stated earlier, this relinquishment may be undesirable in
practice, in light of the European view of airlines as a
"public utility service" instead of an "independent eco-
nomic activity.' '232
Significant political barriers exist with respect to the
merging of airlines in Europe. Leon Brittan, the Euro-
pean Commissioner for Competition, stated that the EC
will be vigilant in controlling mergers by strict enforce-
ment of the Community's antitrust rules.23 3 A merger
would also be difficult as a result of the prohibitions
against foreign ownership of national airline carriers.
Most of the Member States require that the national flag
carrier be owned in a majority by citizens of the country of
incorporation.2 3 4 This majority ownership doctrine arose
due to prewar German participation in the ownership of
airlines operating in Latin America. 235 The requirements
were originally meant to prevent the possibility of selling
bilateral rights to third country owners. By prohibiting
noncitizens from acquiring a majority share in the airline,
third countries (not a party to the agreement) cannot, de
facto, acquire rights through the acquisition of the agree-
ing party's airline. Indirectly, a merger between two na-
tional carriers is made impossible unless this requirement
"' See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
232 H. WASSENBERGH, supra note 163, at 139; see also supra note 60 and accompa-
nying text.
2 Airline-Merger Caution Abroad, N.Y. Times, June 3, 1989, at 46, col. 6.
2- Airlines Will Cooperate, Not Merge, after Deregulation of Europe in 1992, Av. WEEK
& SPACE TECH., Sept. 5, 1988, at 133.
235 Gertler, supra note 161, at 62.
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is eliminated." 6
The most likely consequence of the 1992 deregulation
will be increased cooperation between the national carri-
ers. Guenter Eser, director of the International Air
Transport Association, has stated, "I can't see national
governments giving up their national airlines, but I do see
close cooperation. '"37 Evidence of this cooperation can
be seen in the development of two international computer
reservation systems.23 8 The first system to be imple-
mented, commonly referred to as "Amadeus," includes
such airlines as Lufthansa (Germany), Air France
(France), Iberia (Spain), and SAS (Denmark, Norway and
Sweden).239 The second system, referred to as "Galileo,"
is to be implemented with the cooperation of British Air-
ways (United Kingdom), Alitalia (Italy), KLM (Royal
Dutch Airline), and SwissAir (non-EC member Switzer-
land).240 The national carriers insist that the listings will
not be prejudicial nor will they discriminate against air-
lines not involved in the project. Smaller airlines such as
Raynair (Ireland), however, are fearful that the systems
may effectively shut out competition.2 4'
Many of the advocates of the deregulation system are
airline users. 42 Air fares in Europe are dramatically
higher than in the United States.2 43 Deregulation, or even
a unified carrier system, may not result in a decrease in
2, There is precedent existing within the Treaty of Rome for the abolition of
these requirements through the application of the rules on freedom of establish-
ment as laid down in Articles 52-58. These rules have yet to be applied in this
context. Haanappel, supra note 97, at 103 n.97. Even if these rules are applied to
nullify the Member State national laws governing ownership, the problem may
not be eradicated due to a standard "substantial ownership and effective control
clause" being inserted in many bilateral agreements. Id. at 104. This could only
be resolved by renegotiations of the existing bilateral agreements.
237 Gertler, supra note 161, at 62.
238New Computerized Reservation Systems Could Squeeze Small European Airlines, Wall




242 See Comment, supra note 85, at 383.
243 See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
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fares comparable to the fare decreases in the United
States. The difference in the fares between the United
States and Europe is attributable to higher European op-
erating costs, such as airport and air navigation fees, as
well as higher fuel CoStS. 2 44 Stringent regulations on hir-
ing and firing increase labor costs.2 45 Further, night flying
restrictions cut the European carriers' working period by
24%.46 On average, the cost per passenger for a Euro-
pean carrier ranges up to 20% higher than the cost per
passenger for a United States carrier.2 47 These fixed costs
will remain even if deregulation continues.
Even though European firms have recorded profit levels
far below the private firms of the United States, the na-
tional airlines have been experiencing economic growth
in the last few years. 248  For example, Air France an-
nounced a year of record growth in 1988. Passenger traf-
fic rose 8.8% on a capacity increase of 7.9%,249 and net
profits were estimated at 1.2 billion francs or approxi-
244 Comment, supra note 85, at 387 n.201.
(1) Fuel is up to 50% more expensive because of higher taxes; (2)
labor costs are up to twice as high (although this is partly because
the cartel has allowed low-productivity airlines to survive); (3) mili-
tary and political restrictions make European air routes, on average,
15% (and in extreme cases 47%) longer than the distance a crow
would fly; (4) operating aircraft over Europe's short distances has
the same effect on fuel efficiency as stopping and starting a car in a
traffic jam.
Id.; see also Air Transport, supra note 78, at 34.
245 Air Transport, supra note 78, at 34.
244 Comment, supra note 85, at 387.
247 M. EMERSON, supra note 1, at 117 (showing also that ticket prices were on
average 35% to 40% higher). This figure is most likely taking into account the
United States discount price, which is a paid-in-advance or special price, and not
the "full fare" price which has tripled in the last 10 years, and for the most part is
more expensive than European tickets. See Barrett, Promises of Cheap Fares, THE
INDEPENDENT, June 21, 1990, at 16.
2' M. EMERSON, supra note 1, at 116.
249 Tourism in France in 1989, Com. News, May 1989, at 2. Air France's share of
international freight traffic among other European airlines reached 20.1 %. Fur-
ther growth has been increased by European airlines introducing promotional
features and new travel packages. In 1989, Air France embarked upon an aggres-
sive campaign based on the Bicentennial of the French Revolution. The vacation
plans include greater flexibility of design for the passenger by combining Paris
with one or more European capitals. Id.
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mately 190 million dollars for 1987.25
Moreover, Americans enjoy a greater selection of flights
than Europeans. On a given day there are more than 100
flights between Los Angeles and San Francisco. There
are fewer than 30 flights, on the other hand, from
Heathrow to Paris, even with the recent addition of Brit-
ish Midland. 25' Further, the fare between Los Angeles
and San Francisco is 50% less than the fare between
Heathrow and Paris. The sheer unavailability of Euro-
pean flights will likely keep prices at a high level.
V. EFFECT ON THE UNITED STATES
The United States has advocated an open skies policy
ever since the passage of the Airline Deregulation Act of
1978.252 The Act is evidence that airline deregulation can
be achieved, and establishes the United States as an exam-
ple for other nations.2 53 The deregulatory policies of the
United States, spawned in the 1970s, have placed pres-
sure on various industries in other nations to conform,
the most significant pressure being in the air transport
sector.25 4 Reluctantly, the United States has tolerated co-
ordination of tariffs and pricing by the Member States by
exempting United States carriers operating within Europe
from domestic antitrust laws. 255 This exemption from do-
mestic antitrust laws has tended to keep fares on the up-
per end of the scale in Europe.
On August 7, 1990, the United States Department of
Justice recommended to the Department of Transporta-
tion that the antitrust exemption held by the United
2o Id.
2-11 Barrett, supra note 169, at 26.
252 Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (1978); see also, United States v. FCC,
1978-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,205 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (reference to the "open
skies" policy of the United States).
25. Id. For effects of Canadian and New Zealand air deregulation see Haanap-
pel, supra note 97, at 89-92.
254 Haanappel, supra note 97, at 80.
2. Dagtoglou, supra note 77, at 340.
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States carriers be curtailed. 56 The current immunity
under the Federal Aviation Act may be withdrawn alto-
gether. The United States Attorney General's office
stated that the immunity should be lifted for "consumer
protection. 12 5 7  Attorney General Dick Thornburgh
stated, "[m]any Americans may not realize that the prices
of their airline tickets for travel abroad are set by what is
in effect a legalized international cartel. ' 2 58 Removing
this immunity will also inject greater competition into the
European air industry due to the fact that the United
States airlines will be flying at a reduced price.
If the United States actually gets what it has been hop-
ing for, a deregulated international air transport system,
the effect upon the United States civil aviation industry
may be only minimal. The United States International
Trade Commission has stated that "[t]he U.S. air-trans-
port industry will not be immediately or specifically af-
fected" by the EC directives.2 5 9 The transport directives
apply only to Member States and take no position with
respect to existing bilateral agreements. Further, thq EC
has made no announcement regarding potential renegoti-
ation of such agreements. The United States aircraft
manufacturers and trade associations are taking a wait and
see approach to the air transport policy of the EC, noting
that Member States have been known in the past to take
actions directly contrary to existing directives.2 6' The
Commission did recognize the possibility of a unified air
traffic system as a result of the EC policy and stated that
such a system "could increase its [the EC airline's] bar-
gaining powers with the United States and other countries
over existing international air-traffic agreements." '261




29 Report, supra note 12, at 8-6.
260 Id.
261 Id. The commission further stated, "[t]he integration of the European air
traffic market could also lead to a single negotiating unit, becoming stronger and
more effective than is the case with individual countries .. " Id.
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In the past, United States airlines have experienced nu-
merous problems within the EC in areas such as computer
reservation systems, user fees, airport access, and ground
handling services. 62 First, Member State airline carriers
are allowed to freely provide for their own ground han-
dling services while operating Within the United States.
In contrast, United States carriers have been denied a re-
ciprocal right. The services being denied include aircraft
maintenance, ticketing, catering, and cargo loading. Both
the United States Department of State and the United
States Department of Transportation have been seeking a
remedy for this situation. 63
Second, it is unclear whether or not the United States
computer reservations systems will be allowed to compete
with Galileo and Amadeus. 26 It is possible that interna-
tional travelers will not have access to United States fares
through the European computer system. It is also feared
that even if the United States is allowed to participate, the
system may discriminate in favor of the 'national carriers.
The USITC points out that it is "unclear how foreign car-
riers will be treated and whether they will have the non-
discriminatory and transparency features found in the
U.S. systems. ' 265
Third, the United States does not charge a user fee for
the privilege of operating within United States air
space.2 6 6 A reciprocal right does not exist in Europe. The
United States carriers incur more than 60 million dollars
annually for fees charged for use of European airspace.
The EC directives are silent on this and all of the forego-
ing aspects, but many United States carriers are hopeful
that deregulation will eradicate these problems. 67
262 Report, supra note 12, at 8-11.
263 Id.
2- See supra notes 239-40 and accompanying text.
2'6.5 Id.
66 Id.
267 Report, supra note 12; at 8-6. Member State carriers similarly have conten-
tions against the United States. Many Europeans are of the opinion that if the
United States airlines are allowed free flight between various cities in an inte-
COMMENTS
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Air transport problems in the EC were largely ignored
until the 1987 directives of the Council. Even though the
Member States have agreed that there is a need for liber-
alization of the present scheme, there is still resistance in
letting go of the nationally operated regulatory system.
The transitional period of deregulation has improved the
current pricing scheme only minimally by way of strictly
controlled competition. The Member States intend to
continue this phasing period and have explicitly stated
disapproval of a "free for all," open skies type policy
which exists in the United States. More is at stake than
the mere opening up of air routes and the lowering of
pricing tariffs. The airlines are a symbol of the member
states, much like a national flag. This concept of national-
ity and public orientation lends itself to regulation more
than a capitalistic regime of profit seeking air carriers.
Furthermore, is unlikely that airline ticket prices in Eu-
rope will equal fares in the United States, due in part to
controlled competition, but also due to the higher secon-
dary cost of flight maintenance, labor, and fuel. The
greatest increase in competition arising from the market
scheme will probably be between European carriers and
other modes of transportation, such as rail, rather than
between European carriers and the United States. If gov-
ernmental cross-subsidies, the equalization process used
for the protection of all methods of transport, are elimi-
nated, the market will determine which method of trans-
port is more profitable. Since air transport is a quicker,
more convenient method of shipment, a drop in air
freight prices could lead to increased competition in the
rail industry, but this increase would no longer be offset
by a government subsidy.
Several European airlines will likely collapse as a result
grated Europe, then it is only equitable to allow the national airlines a reciprocal
right between various United States cities. The United States has made no formal
statement on this issue. Id.
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of increased intrastate and interstate competition. There
will be a need for the pooling of resources, capital, and
access to routes to enable survival. In order for airline
mergers to take place, extensive political barriers such as
the national laws concerning ownership and EC antitrust
provisions must be overcome. Whether or not the EC
laws will be amended to allow for a merged EC airline sys-
tem remains to be seen. The EC's hope is that the differ-
ences in competitive ability will be eradicated by the time
the phasing period is over, and every airline will be on
equal footing when full deregulation occurs, thereby mak-
ing a merger unnecessary.
Even though no official policy has been stated, the rene-
gotiation of bilateral agreements will be necessary to
maintain a deregulated regime. The filing or establish-
ment of tariff quotas will no longer be predicated on in-
ter-airline consultation, a process which is mandatory in
most bilateral agreements. It will be determined largely
by market fluctuations. The agreements as they stand
may be construed as violative of the Treaty competition
rules prohibiting concerted practices in pricing, and have
the potential of being null and void if brought before a
national court.
At the very least, limited deregulation will result in in-
creased cooperation between European carriers. This is
evidenced by the two new computer reservation systems.
European airlines recognize that in order to become an
effective power bloc in transportation, industry fragmen-
tation must be eliminated. Since the relinquishment of
national sovereignty in this area seems too drastic at this
point, cooperation between the Member States is likely to
be the most visible effect.
The many changes taking place in Europe due to the
1992 unification policies are interrelated and the trans-
portation sector cannot be viewed in a vacuum. The de-
regulation could be halted, or delayed, if a breakdown in
the political scheme of unification should arise between
the Member States; the most significant threat being the
position of the new Germany. Yet for the time being, it
appears that lower fares and increased competition are on
the European horizon. For those seeking lower fares for
European travel and shipping, any means which produce
this end will be an unqualified success.
In 1944, the Brazilian delegate to the Chicago Confer-
ence expressed the view that, "perhaps the time will never
be ripe" for the internationalization of civil aviation.2 6 8
An optimistic capitalist, however, would retort that "if
market forces demand something, and however impossi-
ble it seems within an existing legal framework, ways and
means are often found.'269 270
268 Gertler, supra note 161, at 78.
2-9 Crush, The Market Place of Cheap International Air Travel in Europe, 17 INT'L Bus.
LAw 21, 22 (1989).
270 For further information regarding developments within the EC, a list of all
measures taken in preparation for 1992 and their status is published quarterly by
the E.C. Committee of the American Chamber of Commerce in Belgium. Direc-
tives are published in the Official Journal of the European Communities and are
available in most libraries. The Commission also publishes a monthly magazine,
Europe, which is available by subscription.
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